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Neil Greenberg
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ABSTRACT. The pursuit of truth is woven into the
fabric of every organism*. Any estimate of how best to
survive and thrive in the reality in which we are
immersed requires a sense of self, of the world, and of
their relationship to each other. I wish to explore the
idea that this pursuit has at its heart two
complementary modes of reality testing utilizing
separate cerebral systems which deal, respectively
with the correspondence of experience with the world
and the coherence of the experience with previous
experiences: is it real and does it fit? At
multiple levels of the nervous system, confidence in
the validity of a belief depends on these two processes
working independently and in concert.
I wish to explore the biological significance of
belief and truth from the integrative

perspective of ethology. That is, the lenses of
developmental biology, ecology, evolutionary biology,
and physiology will be focused on the process of
extracting meaning from experiences.
Two complementary cerebral processes ordinarily
work in lockstep to provide us with varying degrees of
confidence in the strength of ensuing beliefs: These
processes involve an estimation of the validity of
correspondence and coherence. Such estimations of
validity guides the continuing reconciling of
intentions, expectations, and actions at every level of
the nervous system, invoking energetically more
expensive higher levels only when lower levels are
inadequate. A third cerebral area reveals itself only in
extraordinary circumstances and appears to evoke
hypergnosia, an overwhelming and sometimes
ecstatic sense of truth.
Correspondence involves reality-testing of a
percept, the cerebral representation of a fragment of
experience [in the world]. Coherence involves
theorizing, that is, reality-testing of a percept by
how well it relates to previous and ongoing parallel
and collateral experiences. As organisms develop, the
reference base of previous experiences is enlarged
and refined. A valid correspondence is consonant with
a theory; a valid theory is corroborated by
correspondences. In large measure, these mutually
supportive cerebral processes are lateralized in
different hemispheres of the brain. Their function is
more-or-less balanced, but asymmetrical influence on
confidence can be evoked by developmental
circumstances that range from the willing suspension
of disbelief to expectations and other cognitive biases
that can undermine our effectiveness in the real world.
.
.

I
SEEK and SOLVE
.
ALL men by nature
desire to know. An
indication of this is the
delight we take in our
senses; for even apart
from their usefulness they
are loved for themselves
... opening lines of
Aristotle's Metaphysics
.
..
. Aristotle's opening comment from the Metaphysics
gives us a starting point for an exploration of the
natural history of belief. The "need to know," like
all motivational systems, varies in perceived
urgency and is energized accordingly. The vast
amount of adaptive change, including coping with
environments that do not meet our expectations,
occurs at nonconscious levels as a hierarchy of
progressively more demanding automatized coping
responses are activated. Dissonance that cannot be
resolved with these relatively inexpensive
mechanisms, may evoke an increasing sense of
urgency until the threshold to consciousness and
active problem solving is attained.
The map for this enterprise seems to be a landscape
of circularity, as the congenital and acquired

pathways that are found constantly change and are
being changed by experience.
Humans are not alone in their need to know. All
organisms must develop some sort of sense of their
competencies, boundaries, and the environment in
which they must make their way. But as humans
we seem to be extraordinary in the delight we take.
Aristotle also identifies a self-reinforcing
dimension, what Konrad Lorenz calls autotelic
(1981) when speaking of play.
Beliefs are learned and like most learning they
enable organisms to express the behavioral patterns
they have acquired as a result of experience. Most
(but certainly not all) experience is of the change is
the relationship between an organism and its
environment, sometimes attributable to necessary
developmental change in the organism, but
especially the result of changes in the environment
(and organisms are part of their own
environments).
Beliefs are organized relative to the environment in
which they deploy adaptive actions, but also
relative to each other. These relationships,
sometimes ephemeral connections, reflect causation
as best as possible and constitute a sort of theory. A
bias that guides future actions and is in return
reformulated every time an action is less than
optimal. Much like the theorizing enabled by
accumulated sensory information, curiosity often
flourishes best in safe zones, when needs other than
curiosity are not flooding the system: Klaus Held
(2002) suggests that such "...curiosity was
transformed for the first time with the Greeks into
the striving for a knowledge that no longer had as
its justification the promise of better orientation
within individual, particular life-worlds. Aristotle
introduced the term theôria... for this kind of
knowing." (Held 2002:89).

The need to know, however, while serving the
developing human, may be distracting if pursued
obsessively: the organism need not be perfect, only
relatively competitive to participate in the
evolutionary race.* At a certain point, when the
cost of assimilating and accommodating new
information exceeds benefit, we may just choose to
"let the mystery be" (Dement, I. 1992).
We may take great pleasure from exercising
curiosity and seeking and solving mysteries, but
there is also what Rudolph Otto (1923) called the
Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans. This is
something wholly other than a merely fascinating
mystery: it evokes the awesome, ineffable, sense of
the numinous, and when apprehended, can sweep
over one like a tide or burst upon us evoking a
frenzy or ecstasy. As we become able, there are
many mysteries of which we can speak. The fixed
need to know and the flexible sharing of knowledge
is the gene-culture co-evolutionary spiral.
(Lumsden).
Knowing is apparently intrinsically satisfying.
Abraham Maslow (1966) regarded it as one of "the
richest sources of esthetic raptures, of semi
religious ecstasies, of experiences of awe and ...
among the ultimate joys of living." But ecstasy and
joy have some corollaries in biology and in the
instance of knowing Maslow might regard it as
anxiolytic, but more recently we can say that it is at
least in part because information, as it penetrates
more deeply into the integrative centers of the
brain, may stimulate progressively more opioid
receptors (e.g., Biederman &Vessel. 2008).
Novelty presents itself relentlessly, and always
optimizing, that is, assessing cost and benefits: we
attend to those elements that promise to repay our
interests the most. All confrontation with novelty
evokes some measure of activation of the pathways
that enable the stress response in the autonomic

nervous system and, much like muscle tone, we
find what for us is at a given time the optimum
autonomic tone. This tone enables rapid responses
to coping with novelty, much like our muscles, to
take advantage of apparent opportunities or avoid
unnecessary challenges.
The resolution of a confrontation with novelty or
unexpected events is the adaptive process described
by Piaget as, one of continuous assimilation of
internally mediated consequences of the
organism s action on the environment and the
resulting accommodation of these action schemes
into the previously formed structure (Hutcheon
1996:373, citing Piaget 1980:89).
If we agree with Einstein that mystery is the key to
art, science, and religion, then science, by
increasing the mystery of which we are aware, can
be viewed as a great machine of spirituality. As
Popper (1968) said, "our knowledge is finite but
our ignorance is infinite The more we learn about
the world, and the deeper our learning, the more
conscious, specific, and articulate will be our
knowledge of what we do not know, our
knowledge of our ignorance." [For this, indeed, is
the main source of our ignorance--the fact that our
knowledge can be only finite, while our ignorance
must necessarily be infinite. ]
The seek-and-solve strategy of growth and
development results in progressively effective
competencies at every level of the organism and
also an enlarging reservoir of experiences to act as
reference points to enable more effective coping
with present and future needs. In their own
developmental and experiential time, our
understanding of the realities of the world enlarges.
Consciously or otherwise, we appreciate their part
in the causes and consequences of behavioral
patterns. As patterns become consolidated and
more reliable in the present, they also become the

filters that evaluate future experiences for their
utility and the basis on which we make predictions
about possible future needs. They are our beliefs.
.

II.
BELIEFS and TRUTHS
.
"... knowledge itself is power"
(Francis Bacon, 1597) . The
end of our foundation is the
knowledge of causes, and
secret motions of things; and
the enlarging of the bounds
of human Empire, to the
effecting of all things
possible. (1627).

.
Beliefs are states of the organism that enable it to
cope with change, and they succeed or fail largely
to the extent that they are valid -- or at least more
valid than that of their competitors in avoiding
danger or securing advantage for itself or its kin.
The vast number of beliefs are changes in the
organism based on experiences as preliminary as
sensory-motor reflexes, encounters of which we
are utterly unaware. There is an extraordinary
economy in the organism such that only
ineffective coping at low levels will recruit the
next most energetically demanding levels. We

become aware of dissonances only when they are
extreme enough to require conscious awareness.
Thus we make our way through the environment,
the final arbiter of an organism's ability to
compete for limited resources or cooperate in
securing resources for its group.
The need to know Aristotle addressed in the
opening lines of his Metaphysics is engrained in
all organisms in a changing environment, but it is
the mainspring of the human experiment. That is,
the extracting of patterns from experience that
enable the development of beliefs that enlarge its
power over nature at the same time as its capacity
to respond to the experience of nature evokes
neuroplastic change. The various mechanisms of
mind collaborate in this cycle of control and
coping with the consequences they create. In all
likelihood these evolved in response to a variety
of needs and have only recently in our history
come to have this uneasy alliance of functions
that enables us to believe and assess relative
confidence in specific beliefs.
We hold beliefs and we become progressively
more-or-less confident in their validity because of
how they meet biological needs.
The relative urgency of these needs affects our
tolerance for ambiguity and the ease with which
confidence is won. Not every belief is rigorously
tested, of course, many are scaffolds that enable
temporary stability while a more elaborate
cognitive structure is built. Other beliefs are
recreational or playful, and in support of their
potential contribution to development,
understanding, and insight, we even suspend
disbelief. We hold many beliefs to be relatively
harmless in the way that many toys and games
are. Play for example, may contribute
significantly to the development of useful abilities
like eye-hand-coordination, social skills, and

perhaps especially, self knowledge. At first we
acquire knowledge that informs us of personal
competencies and physical boundaries, but
eventually cognitive structures, both simple and
the most elaborate we can devise will develop.
Pursuing and playing with beliefs as with toys,
contributes to competence in sensory perception,
cognitive integration, and selection of appropriate
actions. But in humans as in other species, as
maturation continues, play can become very
serious.
Biology of Belief. I wish to explore truth and
"belief" from the integrative perspective of
ethology. I believe(!) that these concepts guide
the manner in which we control and are
controlled by our environments and are best
understood when the lenses of developmental
biology, ecology, evolutionary biology, and
physiology are brought to focus on our actions.
The convergence of these perspectives enables us
to extract a richer meaning from our experiences
and thereby invest derived beliefs with more
confidence. Beliefs are, in this view, true in
proportion to our confidence in their validity,
however validity can never be complete, although
its pursuit may be preparation for an
apprehension of phenomenal truth. Experiences
we wish to explore are also, admittedly,
vulnerable to acquired or congenital biases, not
least of which are limitations on possible
experiences imposed by the sensory and
perceptual apparatus we possess. This apparatus
is itself shaped by the natural selection imposed
on countless generations of organisms meeting
needs and then complemented with our individual
neurodevelopmental plasticity. With respect to
sociality, a critical human need and an
overarching element of the human environment in
which beliefs are formed and tested, our
behavioral plasticity (and corresponding

underlying neural plasticity) can range from a
mother-infant bond through passionate
participation in a crowd, and is thus imbued with
both poignancy and power.
Beliefs serve needs. The need for confidence in a
belief is in lockstep with the real or perceived
urgency of the need it may serve to mitigate. The
sense of urgency is related to the
physiological stress effect, which, may be
manifest along a range from subclinical to
emergency and proportionately energizes the
appropriate motivational system that serves a
particular need. There is a hierarchy of needs,
well known to most students of psychology as
Maslow s Need Hierarchy. On a scale of
relative urgency from basic biological integrity
(health: physiology and homeostasis), to personal
safety, need for society, desire for distinction
(esteem in the eyes of a potential reproductive
partner), to self-actualization, which to a
biologist as well as an Army recruiter, involves
being all you can be, most specifically to
contribute directly or indirectly to kin and the
next generation.
Truths are beliefs about which validity is
absolute, beyond confidence. Biological fitness,
however, does not require perfection, it needs
only for a trait, perhaps a belief, to be better than
that of competitors. While there are always novel
phenomena, unsolved mysteries, there is
dissonance -- always a mismatch between reality
and our understanding of it. All dissonance -evokes some measure of the stress response (see
below) but unsolved mysteries and inexplicable
or extraordinary occurrences can also be haunting
and even debilitating. As Camus observed,
erroneous beliefs serve needs also: "A world that
can be explained even with bad reasons is a
familiar world. But on the other hand, in a

universe divested of illusions and lights, man
feels an alien, a stranger..." and as T.H. Huxley
(1880) famously observed, "Irrationally held
truths may be more harmful than reasoned
errors."
Mindful of imperfect senses, reasoning involves
corroboration and social validation, and we are
confident of our beliefs to that extent. In an
uncertain world, however, we can never have
sufficient confidence. In such situations (aren t
they all) we will deploy our full panoply of
strategies or mechanisms and invest progressively
more energy in approximating a belief about
which there can be no doubt a truth. We
enlarge our confidence in beliefs by testing them
against reality, by means of the
neurophysiological processes of correspondence
and coherence.
.

III
REALITY TESTING
.
"There are two modes of
knowing, through argument
and experience. Argument
brings conclusions and
compels us to concede them,
but does not cause certainty
nor remove the doubts in

order that the mind may
remain at rest in truth,
unless this is provided by
experience"(Roger Bacon,
1268)*
.
.
. Correspondence and coherence are venerable
constructs in philosophy which may well reflect
dispositions and intrinsic biases attributable to the
biology of the brain. Correspondence relies on
experience of the world and occurs "when the
facts and the proposition are identical," "What a
man believes upon grossly insufficient evidence
is an index into his desires of which he himself is
often unconscious. If a man is offered a fact
which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize
it closely, and unless the evidence is
overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on
the other hand, he is offered something which
affords a reason for acting in accordance to his
instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest
evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this
way." (Bertrand Russell 1912) from his "Roads to
Freedom"). That is, external "reality" matches its
internal representation. "Knowledge is the
conformity of the object and the intellect," said
Averroës in the 12th century.
Correspondence began and continues to rely on
(almost) random encounters with the world (as in
infants) and then perceptions and curiosity. It is
basically inductive and its processes provide the
experiential premises of our inner representation
of the world organized as cause-and-effect
theories. First sensory contact of an organism
with the world creates an impression a
sensation which participates in the internal
representation of the world. Internal
representations then evoke responses that more or

less effectively cope with the environment, based
in part on a previous experience, we behave in the
most likely way to be successful, and much of
this is coordinated by local mechanisms
distributed throughout the body at the far reaches
of the nervous system. There appears to be
intrinsic pleasure that instantiates the seek-andsolve paradigm.
The economy of the body, mentioned earlier, will
resist activation of a hierarchically higher
mechanism to interpret and cope with a mismatch
only when peripheral mechanisms have not
resolved it. Dissatisfaction will lead to the
problem being kicked upstairs to a higher
hierarchical level, often energized by a growing
stress response. Progressively more unresolved
dissonance and the problem may evoke the most
costly procedures of all, involving conscious
attention. There is a large and rapidly growing
literature of error-detection (van Veen and Carter
2006) encouraged by a distinctive signal ( error
related negativity detected by eeg) and
associated with the activity of the anterior
cingulate cortex (van Veen and Carter 2002).
Functions of specific areas of the brain are
becoming better known by means of emerging
radiological techniques, although many
researchers remain very wary of
structure/function correlations. Still there are
observations that may inspire hypotheses about
specific brain functions humans use to test reality.
When the verbal centers of the left hemisphere (in
a split-brain patient) do not have access to what
was shown to the right hemisphere, they will
make up a story. A right hemisphere lesion will
lead to uncontrolled left hemisphere
confabulating -- improvising plausible stories to
rationalize missing data. In spontaneous
confabulation, memories of past experiences

(rather than ongoing realities) dominate narratives
(Schnider 2003), recalling the deep neurological
relationship between memory and imagination
(see Schachter et al. 2007).
Coherence involves "the quality or state of
logical or orderly relationship of parts;" leading to
a united or orderly whole. The process is
internal and works with the percepts that
correspondence provides. To ensure orderly
integration of and access to experience, "narrative
integration" of input is essential. At its best, our
apparently continuous stream of consciousness is
actually a series of frames, of stills, of
snapshots" -- what Oliver Sacks called
cinematic vision (Sacks 2004).
Internal representations of the world must "fit"
with all preceding and collateral representations.
Coherence is integral to cognition at every level,
not least one's ineffable self, but is most
publically manifest as our ability to create
narrative: theories or stories based on likely
causes and consequences. The need to narrate was
put well by Kathryn Morton (1984): "A warp in
the simian brain," she wrote, "made us insatiable
for patterns--patterns of sequence, of behavior, of
feeling--connections, reasons, causes: stories...
Nothing passes but the mind grabs it and looks
for a way to fit it into a story....Feverish for
order... "
Coherence strengthens our confidence in internal
representations by assimilating perceptions
consistent with that model, reconciling internal
contradictions, and accommodating anomalies.
Coherence is basically deductive and can act to
"inform" perceptions about what to expect. The
power of expectations, we are learning in recent
years, is a formidable, if not the key element of

conscious or non-conscious placebo effects (for
example, Stewart-Williams and Podd. 2004).
A narrative is a more-or-less linear sequence of
ideas, and a theory is a narrative about causal
relationships. It is by means of testing predictions
informed by theories that infants develop, and it
is this mode of operation that grows with us and
serves the scientist and the infant. Gopnik and
colleagues have developed a powerful metaphor
with their work on the scientist in the crib (for
example, Gopnik et al. 1999). Agnes Arbor
(1954) points out that "when a scientist has a
belief based on observations, its consistency with
related beliefs based on other observations is an
indication of the confidence we may have in its
possible 'truth'" (p70). As Coleridge put it, "The
imagination, organizing (as it were) the flux of
the senses... gives birth to a system of symbols. . .
consubstantial with the truths of which they are
the conductors."
Confidence. When dissonances are significant
enough to evoke levels of stress activation to a
level that gets our attention, we either dedicate
some effort to obtaining more or better data,
enhancing coherence by utilizing new data, or
considering more coherent reconfigurations of the
data we have. As the literature of cognitive
dissonance theory abundantly shows, stress often
leads us to selectively neglect or enhance key
information, and while our resulting model may
not be accurate, it may be sufficient, and stress
levels are reduced to the extent we are successful.
The processes of reality testing leading to
confidence can motivate additional empirical
testing: curiosity and exploration. They also
encourage more elaborate or parsimonious
narratives or texts into which experience is
woven. The desire for confidence can range, of

course, from the frivolous to deep concern about
one's "immortal soul."
When there is a perceived urgency of the need for
increasing confidence, the activity invested in
both establishing correspondence (by interacting
with the environment) and coherence (by
considering alternative narratives) may become
intense. For example, Aouizerate (et al. 2004)
identified obsessive collecting as one of the ways
obsessive-compulsive disorder presents. In their
review, they find stress-provoking erroneous
internal perceptions as the central phenomenon
and identify structures most prominent in their
contribution to the disorder, including
orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex,
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
At higher levels of cognition, the two realitytesting processes may become asymmetrical
when we are not satisfied with experiential
evidence or the internal scheme for the
organization of the evidence. To the extent that
the urgency is perceived, elements of the
autonomic nervous system -- the stress response - become engaged and energize the appropriate
motivational system for meeting this particular
need for increased confidence, the compass for
which is "truth.".
These sibling strategies are also, in Robert
Sternberg's view key to the concept of
intelligence. ... the more intelligent, adaptive
person has achieved a higher degree of external
correspondence and internal coherence in his or
her knowledge based and belief structures. People
think unintelligently to the extent to which they
make errors in achieving external correspondence
or internal coherence (Sternberg 1997:1031).
The tests of reality attributable to correspondence
and coherence proceed in a progressive mutually

corroborating spiral of interactions, working
together to provide confidence in the reality of a
belief. As organisms that evolved to maximize
biological fitness, beliefs need not be true, but
simply more valid than those of competitors.
Truth is a necessarily unattainable goal that
keeps efforts to enhance validity steering in what
seems the most useful direction at any particular
point in our progress. The processes of acquiring,
sharing, and applying knowledge, like judgments
about what could or should be known, are
subjects of endless discourse. But there is little
that penetrates the depth of our concern about the
meaning of knowledge or illuminates the fragility
of the boundary between knowledge and its
absence as failures of the accustomed system
manifested in the disorders of knowing.

IV
AGNOSIA and HYPERGNOSIA
.
We work in the dark we
do what we can we give
what we have. Our doubt is
our passion and our
passion is our task. The rest
is the madness of art.
Henry James
.
. We may be more or less confident about our
beliefs as processes of the senses and mind
enable, but extraordinary extremes of the process

of establishing or utilizing beliefs can be
instructive. Neurologists are familiar with an
extensive array of failures of one or more parts of
this process attributable to trauma or disease of
the brain that leads to an inability to recognize the
reality of specific kinds of experiences. This is
agnosia, a state in which a person may not be able
to recognize stimuli even though the sensory
system is unimpaired itself. These are unlike
everyday failures of knowing such as when an
experience may be so unique that it does not
accrue sufficient confidence to be taken seriously
or in attentional blindness (e.g., Simmons,
2000), a common outcome of a percept being
rejected for failing the test of coherence.
Among the most interesting of agnosias is
anosognosia, a denial of illness or debility, often
subsequent to right hemisphere brain trauma or
stroke, is a striking example of a mismatch
between one s perceptions and reality. It
involves a denial ranging from indifference to
striking vehemence, often despite (apparently)
clear evidence to the contrary. Spontaneous
anosognosia was characterized by Schnider
(2003) as an inability to adapt thought and
behaviour to ongoing reality.
Hypergnosia, on the other hand is an
extraordinarily intense confidence that an
experience is true. It is particularly informative
because of its extreme nature. The pursuit and
solution of mystery can be imbued with intense
urgency and the ensuing stress response
powerfully energizing --- a pleasure that seems a
heartbeat away from ecstasy. Einstein described
the search for the insight that reconciles disparate
ideas in terms that would credit a mystic in
recalling "the years of searching in the dark for a
truth that one feels but cannot express; the intense
desire and the alterations of confidence and

misgiving, until one breaks through to clarity and
understanding, are only known to him who has
himself experienced them" (in Beveridge,
1950:81). Apparently, when confidence exceeds a
certain threshold, the resolution of stress can
provide a remarkable release. Einstein echoed
the great physiologist, Claude Bernard: "those
who do not know the torment of the unknown
cannot have the joy of discovery." The
neurologist/essayist Oliver Sacks recalled seeing
the periodic table of the elements: The actual
presence of these elements reinforced the feeling
that these were indeed the elemental building
blocks of the universe that the whole universe
was here in microcosm. I had an overwhelming
sense of truth and beauty when I saw the periodic
table. I felt that this was not a mere human
construct, arbitrary, but an actual vision of an
eternal cosmic order, and that any future
discoveries and advances, whatever they might
add, would only reinforce, reaffirm, the truth of
its order (1999). Dostoevsky spoke of an
"eternal harmony" that he occasionally
experienced: There are moments, and it is only
a matter of five or six seconds, when you feel the
presence of the eternal harmony ... a terrible thing
is the frightful clearness with which it manifests
itself and the rapture with which it fills you
(Alajouanine 1963).
We can see the steps taken and eloquently
expressed by such intellectuals and scholars, but
surely this intense experience is known to many
who have abruptly discovered (or invented) a
sense of ineffable and powerfully emotional
insight.
The emotional component that might emerge
when the processes of correspondence and
coherence have gone as far as they could in an
individual might be an extreme expression of the

perceptual and cognitive pleasure described by
Biederman & Vessel (2006). They observed an
increased density of receptors for opioids at the
deepest association areas where contact with
stored information was possible, thereby enabling
a new stimulus access to a large reservoir of
information. With their theory in mind, it is
reasonable to speculate that these everyday
pleasures can increase in intensity, perhaps
orchestrated in part by the processes of the stress
response, such that the excitation that began with
an innocent perception could thereby gain access
to the corpus striatum with its multiple loops
connecting emotional centers to higher cortical
areas and thereby link powerful emotional surges
with enhanced insight.
A sense of possessing a transcendent belief that is
truer than truth, often with a deep sense of
peace and joy, seems to accompany the belief one
has merged with the truth they sought. As Polanyi
put it, "the personal participation of the knower in
the knowledge he believes himself to possess
takes place within a flow of passion. The
passion becomes the final corroboration: We
recognize intellectual beauty as a guide to
discovery and as a mark of truth" (1958:300).
This can be far more powerful than the
satisfaction of a long sought understanding. It can
be a uniquely explosive response in the spirit,
corresponding perhaps, to d'Aquili and
Newberg s "hyperlucid state of absolute unitary
being (AUB) with its extremely strong sense
of reality that is in fact said to be "more real than
baseline reality (1999) In d Aquili s view,
while a baseline sense of reality needs sustained
social corroboration, AUB can persist without it.
This resonates with what Joseph Campbell (1968)
termed aesthetic arrest:
We may dance
toward it and away, achieve glimpses, and even
dwell in its beauty for a time; yet few are those

that have been confirmed in that knowledge of its
ubiquity which antiquity called gnosis and the
Orient calls bodhi: full awakening to the
crystalline purity of the bed or ground of one s
own and yet the world s true being. Like
perfectly transparent crystal, it is there, yet as
though not there; and all things, when seen
through it, become luminous in its light (p 66).
But does such an experience, transformative
though it is, constitute belief? Or might the
pursuit of confidence in beliefs simply be a
preparation for deeper insights?
Agnosia and hypergnosia point to the manner in
which the central nervous system coordinates the
integration of correspondence and coherence in
the pursuit of confidence. This pursuit also
involves the three major integrative capacities of
the brain motivation, affect, and cognition
and the role of the physiological stress response
in orchestrating their activity.

V
THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY of BELIEF
.
Seeking the mind with the mind -- is
this not the greatest of all mistakes?
Sengtsan (3rd Zen patriarch) Hsin
Hsin Ming: Inscribed on the
Believing Mind By Sengtsan,
third Chinese patriarch
http://www.mendosa.com/way2.htm
.
.

.

The direction taken here is in the spirit of
the proposal by Johnstone and Glass (2008).
Their research with brain-injured adults
persuaded them that spiritual experience
involves the interaction of multiple
specialized neuropsychological structures.
They noted that brain activity that
coordinates ongoing and remembered
experience are ordinarily highly
coordinated. Thus, either trauma that
impairs right parietal cortex function or
conscious suppression of the same site, can
enable a sense of selflessness that may then
be interpreted by activity of the left
temporal lobe in terms of remembered,
culturally interpreted and instilled
constructs. Indeed, reality testing itself
involves biologically validated momentary
experiences interpreted in terms of past
experiences. In this relentlessly selfcorrecting updating of the meaning of
experience, we conduct the vital business of
distinguishing internal imagery from
external stimuli.
It is notable that several important
neuropsychiatric syndromes are associated
with dysfunctions in the processes of
reality-testing (correspondence), storytelling (coherence), or their integration. The
role of the left cerebral hemisphere in
creating coherence has been famous since
Ramachandran and Blakeslee's charming
and compelling Phantoms in the Brain
(1998). They support the view, largely
based on the evidence of disinhibition
(release of a neural structure from the
inhibitory influence of another site), that the
left hemisphere includes structures that
work to establish coherence.

Several lines of evidence converge on this
view of reality testing. Notably, the
phenomenon of anosognosia, mentioned
above. In Ramachandran s (1996) view,
the right hemisphere detects discrepancies
between information from sensory input
and information residing in cerebral
schemas (probably residing in the left
hemisphere); it then helps determine the
salience of information and whether or not
it should be relayed further for possible
action. Excellent descriptions are provided
by Ramachandran (1996) who describes
and discusses related agnosias. In
schizophrenia there is evidence that poor
insight into one s disorder is related to
anosognosia, (Lele & Joglekar 1998), as
well as evidence that different neural
pathways are engaged during novel
recognition memory in patients with
schizophrenia compared to healthy
individuals (Crespo-Facorro et al. 2001).
In normal circumstances, gaps in the
continuity of a narrative (and thus
confidence in its veracity) can be
accomplished by interpolation, in which the
next best information available is plugged
into place, much in the way the blind spot in
the back of the retina uses information from
adjacent cells to "fill in." Additionally, the
process of extrapolation can enable
predictions based on past experience, a
plausible trajectory of events, likely
facilitated by the extraordinary access
imagination and memory have to each other
(Hassabis et al 2007). Indeed, the likely
origin of abstractions such as time is likely
based on experience and its representations
(Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002)

How are people able to think about things
they have never seen or touched? We
demonstrate that abstract knowledge can
be built analogically from more
experience-based knowledge. People's
understanding of the abstract domain of
time, for example, is so intimately
dependent on the more experience-based
domain of space that when people make an
air journey or wait in a lunch line, they also
unwittingly (and dramatically) change their
thinking about time. Further, our results
suggest that it is not sensorimotor spatial
experience per se that influences people's
thinking about time, but rather people's
representations of and thinking about their
spatial experience.
PMID: 11934006 [PubMed - indexed for
MEDLINE] When gaps attributable to a
failure of the right hemisphere s
interaction with the left, special efforts are
taken to maintain an apparently seamless
and satisfying narrative. The processes
responsible most likely coincide, at least in
part, with a left hemisphere process
nicknamed the interpreter by Gazzaniga
(2000), a capacity to make an inference
about both internal bodily states and
external actions of ourselves and others . . .
a powerful system that is at the core of
human belief formation . . . . (Gazzaniga
1992:113).
Information about left hemisphere functions
suggest an important role in establishing a
sense of coherence, even at the cost of
interpolating implausible elements as it
accommodates whatever fragments of
experience it has access to. Apparently the
comfort of a narrative that does not possess

gaps is sufficiently valued that conflicting
percepts go unattended. This can evoke a
sense of familiarity and stability
(Ramachandran 1996) that reduces stress.
High confidence also has distinct biological
value if it allows access to and executes
behavioral patterns that advance fitness.
Ambivalence or indecision can undermine
the effectiveness of individual behavior, and
in social contexts, doubt can be contagious,
undermining social and cultural
undertakings predicated on confidence in
the general validity of specific beliefs.
A significant contribution to the
development and maturity of these
processes may be play, including play in
which there is a "willing suspension of
disbelief," Samuel Taylor Coleridge s
(1817/1985) hallmark of artistic creation -overlooking the quality of coherence in the
service of an enlarged insight. Like all play,
the creation and appreciation of aesthetic
objects is best undertaken in a safe
environment, free of uncontrolled stress.
Coleridge contrasted his view with that of
his friend Wordsworth's advocacy of paying
particular attention to novelty as a way of
"awakening the mind's attention from the
lethargy of custom" (Coleridge 1817/1985)
Much of the neuropsychological momentum
for viewing the left hemisphere as an organ
of coherence comes from evidence of
disinhibition. Other information, clues in
real or apparent support for the narrative of
left hemisphere specializations for
coherence, are needed from other sources
where the shadow of possible confounds
attributable to states of disease or damage
are less dark. Of interest in this regard are

clues such as the left hemisphere's
superiority in dealing with abstract object
recognition as opposed to the right
hemisphere's superior ability in specifics
(Marsolek 1999), and its abilities in
probabilistic as opposed to deductive
reasoning, seen more clearly in the right
hemisphere (Osherson et al 1998).
Interestingly, after appropriate priming, a
solution to a semantic problem presented to
the right hemisphere by means of the left
visual field was more likely to evoke a
sense of sudden insight, than when
presented to the right hemisphere (Bowden
& Jung-Beeman, 2003). Apparently the
Aha! sense of sudden insight reported
by participants, involved enhanced activity
in the right superior temporal gyrus, as
revealed by functional magnetic resonance
imaging (Bowden et al. 2005).
Right hemisphere function in validating or
at least enhancing confidence in beliefs
appears more involved with a monitoring
function. Correspondences of the
organism's experience with the real world
begins at the sense organs where a cascade
of feedback loops enables countless
adjustments to fine tune the organism to the
circumstances it finds itself in. For example,
the muscle spindle, a complex peripheral
sense organ embedded in muscle, is
continually responding to mismatches
between the environment the motor
program that anticipates general needs, and
fine details of muscular action needed to
cope with precision. Activities here and
above continually inform higher centers of
control of the ongoing negotiations, and
only the detection of errors that cannot be
adjusted at lower levels get very far

upstream This may constitute a nested
hierarchy of interactions between the
organism and its environment.
Stress. All behavior is an evanescent
extension of morphological and
physiological potential. The stress response
consists of a host of coordinated
physiological (including neurobehavioral)
mechanisms specialized to cope with real or
perceived challenges to real or perceived
biological needs (Greenberg 2002). Needs
in biology can be nicely correlated with the
basic "need hierarchy" proposed by
psychologist Abraham Maslow. For
example, the psychological construct of
self-actualization corresponds to
maximized fitness, ideas linked by the
motto be all you can be.
The motivational systems that serve these
needs are neurologically ancient and highly
integrated. Motivational systems, often
thought of as driving behavior are ever
ready to be activated and guide the system
to meet the current need. This state of
readiness, however, is translated into
adaptive activity only when the resources
required to meet a perceived need are
insufficient. The signal of insufficiency is
the stress response. The physiological stress
response is both a cause and a consequence
of seeking and solving mysteries and its
responses can range from mild autonomic
arousal through dramatic panic. As
mentioned above, it is evoked by even mild
dissonance (Hadley 1996) such as
discrepancies between perceptions and
expectations (Goldstein 1987).
According to D.E. Berlyne (1960), novelty,
uncertainty, or conflict are all particularly

effective in elevating arousal, presumably to
cope with the mismatches they represent
between resting and stimulated state. In his
review of psychoendocrinology of stress,
Seymour Levine (1993) observed that an
adrenocortical stress response is evoked in
proportion to the degree of discrepancy
between current and prior experience of
specific aspects of the environment.
Selective activation of specific brain centers
is at the heart of what Gerald Huether
termed the central adaptation syndrome
(1996), in which higher associative brain
structures are affected by as much as they
affect the deployment of the stress. In his
conceptualization, brain centers that detect
stress can initiate compensating actions
considering both the urgency of the
demands upon the organism and the
perceived prospect for effective coping,
particularly an assessment of the
controllability of the situation. These same
brain sites are subject to modification. The
theory underscores the ability of the stress
response to interact with and orchestrate
adaptive responses as well as the initiating
neurology.
In their recent review, Dedovic (et al.
2009), observed that a consistent
consequence of the psychological stress (of
difficult mental arithmetic) diminished
activity in orbitofrontal regions (assigning
emotional valence to stimuli, decision
making, planning, expectations, and
intuition). Bechara (et al. 2000) considers
the orbitofrontal cortex vital to the decision
making that is guided by somatic
markers (afferent feedback signals

including emotions) that occur at many
levels.
Some view this area as part of the limbic
system, and other limbic areas
(hippocampus) also had suppressed activity.
The anterior cingulate cortex of the frontal
lobe, on the other hand, was more active.
This is a site associated with empathy,
error-detection, and the assessing and
modulating of emotional responses as well
as the many autonomic functions influenced
by the stress response. In the hierarchical
scheme described earlier, progressively
more expensive (in terms of arousal and
attention) coping mechanisms are not
recruited unless necessary.
Stress and Cognition. With respect to the
influence of autonomic activation on
cognition, a striking part of acute
uncontrollable stress that underscores the
sometimes paradoxical aspects of the
response to stressors is the effect of the
initial catecholamine release into body and
brain. The catecholamines released
(dopamine, norepinephrine, and
epinephrine) reallocate internal resources to
cope with emergency circumstances. These
neuromodulators activate the amygdala
(emotional expression and learning) while
they suppress activity in the prefrontal
cortex (associated with foresight and
planning) (Arnsten 1998). The secondary
longer-term coping response involves the
steroid hormones of the adrenal cortex. de
Kloet et al. (1999) observed that while the
hormones of the stress response normally
protect the brain and are necessary for
cognition, damage in specific parts of the
brain can be caused by extreme stress. Part

of this apparent paradox is resolved by the
fact that there are two kinds of adrenal
cortical steroid hormones, which affect the
brain in different ways. Activation of
receptors for these hormones in the brain
usually favor adaptive coping behavior
involving changes in attention and selection
of appropriate responses, but if levels of
activation of the two corticosteroid-receptor
types are unbalanced by disproportionate
secretion of the two hormone types,
maladaptive responses can be evoked.
Further, the stage of ongoing information
processing (acquisition, consolidation,
retention) affects the manner in which the
brain will respond to the hormones
Stress is also a mainspring of creativity,
which like most adaptive processes is
energized by mild to moderate stress: it
affects attention which may evoke close
focus on possible stressors or a wide net of
attention across a larger spectrum of
stimuli. This rapid alternation of cognitive
strategies --searching the repertoire and
focusing on a specific option -- recalls
"fight or flight," a snap decision made as
intensity increases with apparent urgency of
the situation. Under such pressures, familiar
things may be seen in new ways and new
phenomena may be seen free of perceptual
bias, such as inattentional blindness.
As an organism s resources are reallocated
by the stress response to cope with the
ongoing or anticipated challenge. In an echo
of the fight or flight response, distress is
manifest when the consequences of the
stressor are perceived as dangerous to
biological fitness, while eustress is
experienced when the challenge represents

an opportunity to enhance one s prospects
, depending on expectations, emotional
valence, and perceived controllability of the
stressors.
.
.
VI
ENVOI
.
"always becoming, never
is." (Schiller)
.
. This view of truth, like most of an organism s
critical functions, is one of dynamic relationships
between inner and outer worlds, between memory
and imagination, and between valid particulars
and plausible generalities. A cascade of
subsequent approximations by which our
relentless ambition to achieve it is, in the words
of Schiller, "always becoming, never is" *
(quoted by Greenberg 2004)
.
.
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. ENDNOTES
I.

opening lines of Metaphysics by Aristotle, translated by W. D.
Ross, Book I, Part 1.
http://www.classicallibrary.org/aristotle/metaphysics/book01.htm
Dement, I. 1992. Let the mystery be. On Infamous Angel. Songs
of Iris/Forerunner Music Inc/ASCAP, Warner Brothers. On web
at http://www.coquetshack.com/lyrics/Dement_Iris/Let_The_mystery_Be_1289.htm
The more we learn about the world, and the deeper our
learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our
knowledge of what we do not know, our knowledge of our
ignorance. For this, indeed, is the main source of our ignorance-the fact that our knowledge can be only finite, while our
ignorance must necessarily be infinite Karl R. Popper. 1968.
Conjectures and Refutation. HarperCollins Publishers, p.28.
II.
Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est. [For knowledge itself is power.
Francis Bacon, Meditations Sacrae. 1597. Of Heresies (similarly,
The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret
motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human
Empire, to the effecting of all things possible. New Atlantis,
1627).
A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a
familiar world. But on the other hand, in a universe divested of
illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is
without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost
home or the hope of a promised land 1942. Le Mythe de
Sisyphe translated by Justin O Brien in 1955. (Camus
1942/1955)
III
Roger Bacon, (1268) Opus Majus,, Part VI, chapter I, trans. R. B.
Burke, The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon (1928), Vol. 2, 583.
Available at

http://www.todayinsci.com/B/Bacon_Roger/BaconRogerQuotations.htm 7/3/2009
Bertrand Russell (1912) "Roads to Freedom"
Averroës 12th century opus, Destructio destructionum (trans in
1328 and 1526).
Coleridge, S. T. 1816. Lay sermons. The Statesman's Manual.
Web published by Google Books, and in 1817. Biographia
Literaria. Chap. 14:314. In Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 1985. H.J.
Jackson (Ed.). Oxford University Press, New York.
IV
Henry James quoted in analysis by Joyce Carol Oates. The
Madness of Art: Henry James's "The Middle Years" New
Literary History 27.2 (1996) 259-262

V.
Hsin Hsin Ming: Inscribed on the Believing Mind
Sengtsan, third Chinese patriarch
http://www.mendosa.com/way2.htm .

By

VI
Perfection of Practice, like completeness of Opinion, is always
approaching, never arrived; Truth, in the words of Schiller,
immer wird, nie ist; never is, always is a-being. from Thomas
Carlyle (1795: 1881), Characteristics. The Harvard Classics.
1909-14; Paras. 40-58; available on-line at
http://www.bartleby.com/25/3/3.html

"What a man believes upon grossly insufficient evidence is an
index into his desires of which he himself is often unconscious.
If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will
scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he

will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered
something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his
instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence. The
origin of myths is explained in this way." (Bertrand Russell, from
his "Roads to Freedom").
What do we really know? "At Lake Scugog"
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